Hegel draws a distinction between ‘judgements’ and ‘posits’. Judgements serve to explicate a unified subject matter, while posits do not. Because different forms of judgement are marked by specific combinations of logical constants with certain types of predicates, statements combining logical constants with predicates not ‘suited’ for each other cannot express judgements, but only posits. Current accounts of Hegel’s concept of judgement tend either to ignore or reject his conception of posits. This article shows that Hegel’s exclusion of a vast (...) variety of well-formed statements from the realm of judgements contains a valuable insight rather than a flaw. It demonstrates that certain statements, even if correct, cannot contribute to the explication of a non-arbitrarily unified subject matter. Doing justice to Hegel’s notion of posit thus serves to motivate his general conception of judgement as well as his classification of particular types of judgement. (shrink)

The notion of absolute spirit, while undeniably central to Hegel’s philosophy, has been somewhat neglected in the literature. Two main lines of interpretation can be identified: a traditional metaphysical reading, according to which “absolute spirit” refers to an infinite spiritual substance, and a non-metaphysical reading, according to which it refers to activities in which human beings articulate their understanding of the principles that guide their communal life. Both types of reading are problematic exegetically as well as philosophically. This article develops (...) an epistemological reading instead. Accordingly, “absolute spirit” refers to a kind of knowledge, which is distinct from empirical and practical knowledge. Hegel conceives of art, religion, and philosophy as species of such knowledge. While this view might seem astonishing, it can be justified by showing that it is by recourse to paradigmatic instances of artistic, religious, and philosophical activity that the otherwise indefinable notion of truth is fixed. (shrink)

Das Kompositum Anthropotechnik bringt die Vorstellungen von Mensch und Technik in einem Begriff zusammen und setzt sie in eine wechselseitige Beziehung, die vom Inhalt der jeweiligen Vorstellungen abhängt. Anthropotechnik wird daher zu einem umstrittenen Begriff, weil die Zielsetzung und Machbarkeit der Technik von der jeweiligen Deutung des Menschenbegriffs abhängt, aber auch von der Technik auf jenen zurück wirkt. Der Autor Kevin Liggieri zeichnet in seiner begriffsgeschichtlichen Untersuchung zum Begriff der Anthropotechnik nach, wie Mensch und Technik im Laufe dieser Entwicklung immer (...) wieder neu aufeinander verwiesen sind. (shrink)

This paper engages with Kant‘s account of space as a continuum. The stage is set by looking at how the question of spatial continuity comes up in a debate from the 1920s between Ernst Cassirer and logical empiricist thinkers about Kant‘s conception of spatial representation as a pure intuition. While granting that concrete features of space can only be known empirically, Cassirer attempted to save Kant‘s conception by restricting it to the core commitment of space as a continuous coexistent manifold. (...) Cassirer did not however come up with a transcendental argument for spatial continuity. The paper presents such an argument by providing a reading of Kant‘s from which it transpires that Kant does not simply rely on supposed into the continuity of space. It is by way ofinstead that we can know space to be continuous and Kant’s distinction between intuitions and concepts does hinge on such knowledge. (shrink)

Emu aux larmes à l'écoute d'une musique, en arrêt devant ce tableau, vous ressentez un plaisir indéfinissable que n'a su provoquer aucune autre oeuvre. Celle-ci excite vos émotions, captive votre corps, court-circuite votre réflexion. "Que c'est beau!". Perdu en elle, vous fusionnez avec le mystère de sa présence en un acte de communion proche de l'amour romantique ou de l'extase mystique. Vous l'aimez, tout simplement! Entremêlant objet, culture et sujet, la relation artistique superpose aux significations de tous, un plaisir, des (...) questionnements et des interprétations qui ne dépendent que de vous. Comment la relation esthétique s'y prend-elle pour éveiller tant d'émotions et comment l'art s'y prend-il pour transmettre du sens? Quel pourrait être l'apport des sciences cognitives à la compréhension de ces problèmes? Finalement, se pourrait-il que les relations complexes qu'entretiennent l'esthétique, l'artistique et son institutionnalisation, révèlent la nature émergente et systémique de l'Art? (shrink)

Die Auswuchse der technisch-okonomischen Nutzung der irdischen Natur und die mit ihrer wissenschaftlichen Vergegenstandlichung einhergehenden Verkurzungen lassen sich nicht ohne Kultivierung eines asthetischen Naturverhaltnisses einhegen. Unter diesem ist heute weniger denn je die selbstvergessene Kontemplation unberuhrter Natur zu verstehen. Vielmehr geht es um ein schopferisches, potenziell lustvolles Erkunden der Moglichkeiten, kooperativen' Zusammenspiels zwischen naturlich-irdischen Vorgaben und menschlichem Gestalten. Der vorliegende Band will zur Reflexion solcher Moglichkeiten beitragen.

Name der Zeitschrift: SATS Jahrgang: 17 Heft: 2 Seiten: 159-184.

In his introductions to the encyclopaedic Philosophy of Nature and to the Lectures on the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel distinguishes between three ‘attitudes’ (Verhaltensweisen, Einstellungen) towards nature—the theoretical, the practical and the philosophical attitude. According to him there is a certain ‘contradiction’ or tension between our theoretical attitude towards nature, which makes it an object of scientific inquiry, and the practical attitude that we assume as living rational beings who intervene in nature and shape it according to our purposes. This (...) article focuses on how exactly to pinpoint that tension and on how it is resolved in what Hegel calls the ‘philosophical’ or ‘comprehending’ attitude towards nature. (shrink)